[Mike AI]

This is a newsletter I subscribe to. It is from a non-partisan ( albeit hawkish) think tank that specilizes in Foreign Policy and National Security. This is worth a read.

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
> 05 March 2004
>
> The War in Iraq: Redefining and Refocusing
>
> Summary
>
> The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
> war in Iraq is reshaping itself, and that is redefining the
> entire conflict -- and returning attention to Saudi Arabia.
>
> Analysis
>
> The war that began Sept. 11, 2001, has entered a new phase. The
> war in Iraq is reshaping itself -- and that is redefining the
> broader war. There are two aspects of this. The rate at which the
> United States is incurring casualties in Iraq has declined
> dramatically during the past month. One American died on March 2;
> the last American deaths before that occurred Feb. 19. The tempo
> of attacks on U.S. forces has declined, although not as
> dramatically as the number of casualties. This indicates that the
> guerrilla forces focused on U.S. troops have declined in both
> number and quality.
>
> The primary focus of guerrilla operations no longer seems to be
> U.S. forces. The focus appears to be on Iraqis who collaborate
> with the United States, and, more generally, on the Shiite
> community. The Shia did not rise against the U.S. occupation and
> have worked with the United States to facilitate a transfer of
> power that will make them the dominant force in Iraq --
> reflecting the fact that the Shia are 60 percent of the
> population. Attacks on the Shia were signaled early last month
> when a CD-ROM written by top al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
> was captured by U.S. forces. The document on the CD-ROM indicated
> a change in strategy, at least by the jihadist guerrilla faction,
> away from the United States and toward the Shiite community.
>
> The synchronized attacks on Shiite shrines in Baghdad and Karbala
> that killed at least 170 people and injured hundreds more on
> March 2 -- Ashoura, a major religious occasion in Shiite Islam --
> manifested this shift.
>
> The guerrilla movement is split between the remnants of the
> Baathist government and foreign jihadists who entered Iraq to
> fight the United States. The two factions are different
> ideologically and operationally. Ideologically, the Baathists are
> secular and the jihadists are religious. Operationally, the
> Baathists have focused on what might be called conventional
> guerrilla warfare, concentrating on small-unit engagements with
> American forces. The jihadists engage more in classical militant
> operations against softer targets, in particular using suicide
> bombers.
>
> Since December 2003, we have been noting a decline in Baathist
> operational capabilities. The decline has not been a straight
> line down by any means, but it is now an undeniable reality. They
> are certainly not what they were during the Ramadan offensive in
> November 2003. Indeed, that offensive will probably be regarded
> as their high-water mark. As the Baathist capabilities have
> contracted, the relative significance of the jihadists has
> increased. It appears that their numbers have risen, but that
> might well be an illusion created by the decline of the
> Baathists.
>
> The leader of the jihadists appears to be al-Zarqawi, who has
> made a fundamental strategic decision. First, it is clear that he
> does not believe that the United States can be defeated by a
> guerrilla war. Although that might have appeared conceivable
> during the summer and fall of 2003, the failure of the Baathist
> offensive, the redeployment of U.S. forces, the improvement in
> U.S. intelligence and shifts in U.S. tactics have made American
> forces impervious to guerrilla attacks. In effect, the United
> States has won that campaign, and al-Zarqawi knows it.
>
> Following from this first point, al-Zarqawi appears to have
> reached a second conclusion: The primary cause of the failure of
> the guerrilla war lies with Iraq's Shiite community. Had the Shia
> acted in concert with the Sunnis, the U.S. position in Iraq would
> have become untenable last fall. The guerrilla war in the Sunni
> Triangle -- coupled with an intifada in the Shiite regions --
> would have made continued American occupation of Iraq impossible.
> If the United States had not withdrawn, it would have had to pull
> its forces back into small, well-defended enclaves with minimal
> control over the countryside. The situation would have resembled
> Afghanistan.
>
> Al-Zarqawi's analysis of what would have happened had there been
> a violent uprising south of Baghdad is not at all unreasonable.
> The United States did not have sufficient forces to suppress a
> nationwide insurrection, nor did its political requirements
> permit using an Israeli model for confronting an intifada and a
> guerrilla war. The consequences of a Shiite rising would have
> presented a grave problem for the United States.
>
> The rising did not occur, and -- from al-Zarqawi's point of view
> -- this has redefined the war. For him, the problem is not the
> Americans. They could have been defeated if the Shia had only
> played the appropriate role. But the Shia did not play their
> role, and thereby saved the Americans. Therefore, the Shia are
> the real enemy. In effect, the traditional fault line in the
> Islamic world between Sunni and Shia has opened up. To be more
> precise, the jihadists now see the key to victory in Iraq as
> being a war against the Shia that either shatters them, or --
> ideally -- forces them to change course and fall in behind the
> jihadists. If that were to happen, the United States would be
> defeated.
>
> It is not at all clear that al-Zarqawi can succeed in his
> mission. His support within the Iraqi Sunni community is not
> overwhelming, particularly among Sunni leaders. Moreover, the
> assumption that the Sunnis could win a showdown with the Shia is
> doubtful. Finally, the United States is still in Iraq and clearly
> is siding with the Shia against the jihadists. The jihadists can
> launch the kinds of attacks they did this week, but the net
> result is not likely to be either capitulation by the Shia or a
> change of course. The likely result will be that al-Zarqawi will
> find himself trapped between the Sunni elite, the Shia and the
> United States -- a very tough place to be. Al-Zarqawi is not
> going to win his point in Iraq.
>
> Iran and the Islamic World
>
> Still, his analysis applies to the broader Islamic world. The
> Iraqi Shia did not rise against the Americans for two reasons.
> First, they did not want to do anything that might result in a
> Sunni government in Iraq. They had their fill of that under
> Saddam Hussein. Second -- and this is more important -- the
> Iranians who had helped organize and define the Iraqi Shiite
> community had their own strategic interests. Iran wanted Iraq
> either neutralized or turned into a protectorate of Iran. Iraq
> was Iran's historical enemy, and the American problems in Iraq
> gave the Iranians the opportunity they needed to redefine the
> geopolitical status of Iraq -- a fundamental national interest
> for Iran.
>
> The Iranians were more concerned with pursuing their national
> interests than their ideological and religious principles. They
> were confronted with the choice of siding with their Islamic --
> albeit Sunni -- brothers and driving the United States out of
> Iraq, or siding with the United States against the Sunnis. They
> decided to side with the United States. Their national interest
> superseded their religious interests, or possibly they felt so
> estranged from the Sunnis that they did not see a common
> religious bond. Either way, the Iranians decided it was in their
> interest not to drive the Americans out.
>
> In the broader Islamic context, Iran is aligning with the United
> States. This makes the U.S. position in the region impregnable --
> or as close to it as possible. It also means that Saudi Arabia,
> some of whose key subjects had been instrumental in financing al
> Qaeda without significant interference from the Saudi state, is
> now in very deep trouble. Regardless of antipathy between the
> jihadists, including al Qaeda, and the Saudi government, Saudi
> Arabia's problems affect them.
>
> If the Islamic world is going to be torn by Sunni-Shiite strife,
> then it needs to be remembered that, while the Shia are a small
> minority in the Islamic world taken as a whole, they are a
> powerful force -- and represent the majority population -- in the
> Persian Gulf. For example, the Saudi oil fields are in a Shiite-
> dominated region of Saudi Arabia. The entente between the United
> States and Iran makes Iran enormously powerful in the Persian
> Gulf region, both as the most powerful indigenous military force
> and because of its ties to Shia throughout the region. As Iranian
> domination of Iraq increases through a Shiite government there,
> Saudi vulnerability increases dramatically.
>
> In any generalized conflict between Sunnis and Shia, the Saudis
> are vulnerable to both direct military action from Iran and
> indirect subversion from their own Shiite population. Facing an
> internal challenge from jihadists, the Saudis can quickly find
> themselves trapped between the conservatives and the Iranian-
> backed Shia. The conservatives might decide that the territorial
> integrity of Saudi Arabia is of less importance than the
> purification of the House of Saud, while the Iranians might view
> the rise of a more extremist government in Riyadh as worth the
> price of dominating Saudi oil fields. In other words, the Sunni-
> Shiite confrontation could dramatically redraw the map of the
> region.
>
> The United States is, of course, the catalyst for all of this.
> Its original intention was the unilateral governance of Iraq. The
> guerrilla war created a dependency on the Shiites -- and on Iran
> -- that runs counter to the original plan. At the same time, the
> Iranian decision to underwrite U.S. presence in Iraq in exchange
> for a long-term strategic advantage did more than simply save the
> day for the Americans. It set in motion a potential conflict
> between Sunnis and Shia that has two possible benefits. The first
> is to divert the attention of jihadists from the United States to
> the Shia. The second is to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia even
> further, forcing the Saudis to look again to the United States as
> the guarantor of their national security.
>
> Obviously, neither Sunnis nor Shia want the United States to reap
> the rewards of their conflict. Sunni and Shiite leaders in Iraq
> have worked vigorously in the past few days to present a united
> front against al-Zarqawi. In the broader war, a letter from al
> Qaeda, which appears to be authentic, stated that al Qaeda was
> neither involved in the bombings of Shia in Iraq, nor did it
> approve of them. On the other hand, the letter did refer to the
> Shia as infidels, which drives home the point: Al Qaeda does not
> want to benefit the United States, but its hostility toward the
> Shia runs deep. A confrontation with the Shia, in the end, could
> prove irresistible.
>
> We have long discussed the growing U.S.-Iranian entente. Now that
> it is here, it has generated the inevitable jihadist response.
> The most important question in the next few weeks will be whether
> the jihadist attacks on the Shia in Iraq -- and elsewhere, such
> as in Pakistan and Lebanon -- will resonate among the Sunni
> masses. At the moment, it does not seem to be working, but the
> situation is volatile. Moreover, the Sunnis in Iraq might not
> respond, but if Sunnis in other countries do respond and begin
> attacking Shia, the conflict could spread dramatically and
> quickly.
>
> The U.S. Dilemma
>
> There are two problems for the United States. The first is that
> its dependency on the Iranians and the Shia could rapidly trap
> them in unpleasant ways. The United States could quickly become
> hostage to Iranian geopolitical dreams. Second, it follows that
> the United States must work quickly to establish a balance of
> power in the region. The traditional balance is between Iran and
> Iraq. Whatever was promised Iran, if the Iraqi Shia can be
> convinced that they have a national interest separate from their
> religious interests, Iraq could become a counterweight. There is
> tension between An Najaf, the seat of Iraqi Shia, and Qom, Iran's
> religious capital. It is not clear that that tension is enough to
> hang a strategy on, but the United States must find a way to
> contain Iranian ambitions before the solution becomes the
> problem.
>
> If the United States is going to be the counterweight, then it
> needs a geographical base to build on. Iraq can serve as a base
> only if there is a broader regional framework into which it is
> integrated. That means that two countries become vital to the
> United States again: Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The Turks, in the
> end, have too many common interests with the United States not to
> cooperate. It is the Saudis who become the real focus of
> attention.
>
> The Saudis have consistently miscalculated since Sept. 11. As a
> result, they are moving into their worst nightmare: a domestic
> insurrection, rising Shiite power and a hostile United States.
> From the standpoint of Riyadh, things can't get much worse. The
> Saudis have three choices. They can ally with the jihadists, and
> face the United States and Iran together -- not a good idea. They
> can try to make a deal with Iran and face the jihadists and the
> Americans -- an even worse idea. Or they can turn back to the
> United States and use American power to crush the jihadists at
> home and serve as a shield against Iran -- not a great choice,
> but the best of a bad lot. It is the choice they will have to
> make.
>
> That will mean the Saudis not only will shut down all financial
> support for al Qaeda, but also will give the United States direct
> access to Saudi intelligence files -- without exception -- and
> access to Saudi nationals who are working with al Qaeda. That
> will be the American price for any deal. If the Saudis make that
> deal, al Qaeda will become much more visible to the United States
> globally. It will mean the United States is likely to be in a
> position to liquidate al Qaeda.
>
> In the end, the United States can turn lemons into lemonade.
> Having miscalculated on the guerrilla war and having been forced
> to rely on the Shia and the Iranians, the United States -- if it
> is both nimble and implacable -- can wind up running the table.
> We are in a new phase of the war, and eyes are now turning back
> to the original target: Saudi Arabia.
>